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The Problem with
ABA Standard 405(c)
Kathryn Stanchi
I find myself in a difficult position, having been tasked with commenting on
a "best practices" model for ABA Standard 405(c). I believe Professor Melissa
Weresh's guidelines,, as well-thought-out and well-meaning as they are, give
Standard 405(c) a dignity and legitimacy it doesn't deserve. Standard 405(c)
is a pale substitute for tenure and a damaging double standard. And, as a
practical matter, the power to administer Standard 40 5 (c)-and implement
these "best practices"-will likely be in the hands of those who fought what
little security it gives. The sad truth is that Standard 405(c), at least as it is
currently implemented, can't be fixed.
Of course, I understand the practical reasons that clinicians and legal
writing faculty would accept or even fight for Standard 405(c), and I certainly
don't blame us for grabbing it. After years of job insecurity, intellectual
disparagement, and pay inequity, Standard 405(c) looks not too bad.
But this essay takes the position that clinicians and legal writing faculty
deserve better than "not too bad." Standard 405(c) needs to be called out for
what it is: an institutionalized bar to professional advancement divorced from
any reasonable measure of merit.
If all law faculty members, regardless of subject matter taught, were hired
on the same track, whether tenure or Standard 405(c), that would be different.
Or if all faculty members, regardless of subject taught, were given the option
of tenure or Standard 405(c), that would be different. Or if all law faculty
members were hired on Standard 405(c) with tenure awarded to the most
accomplished and productive, the standard would at least have some claim to
surface fairness. But this isn't how Standard 405(c ) currently works. Instead,
Standard 405(c) singles out certain faculty for lesser status based purely on
what subject they teach. It enshrines the discriminatory notion that, regardless
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of merit or accomplishment, "your kind" can go only so far. This kind of
categorical double standard is not defensible.
Suppressing Growth and Potential
Like many categorically biased rules, Standard 405(c) is irrational.
It artificially suppresses the growth and potential of certain faculty by
discouraging them from behavior that might enhance their teaching and the
reputations of their institutions. Standard 405(c) categorically excludes clinical
and legal writing faculty from tenure, regardless of meritorious performance.
Regardless of how much they publish, how well they teach, or how laudatory
their service to the institution, they do not get tenure. Standard 405(c) brands
clinicians and legal writing faculty as "other" and "lesser"-and as with most
branding and categorization it is persistent. Standard 405(c)'s branding,
therefore, discourages upward movement and embeds the existing hierarchy.
Although psychologists may disagree about the value of status hierarchies
within an institution, there is no support for hierarchies that "do not reward
based on performance."3
Under Standard 405(c), clinicians and legal writing faculty do not even get
to compete for tenure. This institutionalized bar on advancement is based not
on merit but on a broad categorization. Although, as noted below, this ceiling
on advancement can inhibit excellence in all aspects of the academic job, it
likely has the greatest inhibitory effect on scholarly production. Scholarship
is time-consuming and difficult, particularly for clinicians and legal writing
faculty, whose teaching duties are labor- and time-intensive. Standard 405(c)
does not offer the kind of institutional reward required for the production of
scholarship, especially with the teaching loads of most clinicians and legal
writing faculty. Moreover, Standard 405(c) gives law schools an explicit reason
not to support clinical and legal writing scholarship. In addition, Standard
405(c) doesn't offer nearly the same employment protection as tenure for
faculty who wish to say something provocative or controversial.
This is particularly illogical as scholarship is considered to be the faculty
responsibility most connected to the prestige and reputation of the institution.
Why wouldn't we want a system where all players had the incentive to produce
the most rigorous, original or analytically cogent work? But under Standard
405(c), that is not what we have.
Clinicians and legal writing faculty cannot even compete fairly with our
peers. As with most discriminatory practices, Standard 405(c) raises the
question of why, given our obvious inferiority, everyone is afraid to let us
compete. Why the need to legislate our second-class status if it is a given? The
answer is that at some point it was decided, without a shred of support, that
legal writing and clinics were not as rigorous, intellectually challenging, or
valuable as other subjects. And so a vicious hierarchical cycle began.
3. Jeffrey Pfeffer & Nancy Langton, The Effect of Wage Dispersion on Satisfaction, Productivity, and
Working Collaborativey: Euidence from College and University Faculty, 38 ADMIN. Scl. Q 382, 388
(s993) (discussing wage dispersion among faculty in the academy) (emphasis in original).
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The Category Problem
Standard 405(c) is reserved for clinical teachers and some legal writing
faculty. Thus, at the outset, a determination is being made that certain subjects
are less worthy of tenure, categorically. Faculty who teach "substantive"
subjects4 are presumed to deserve tenure; clinicians and legal writing faculty
are presumed not to deserve it.
In reality, of course, as with all categorical thinking, Standard 405(c) is both
under- and over-inclusive. Many clinicians and legal writing faculty-including
those who continue to be excluded from tenure-have proved themselves,
against all odds, to have met or exceeded the standards for tenure.5 And many
faculty members who teach "substantive" courses-despite every advantage-
have proved themselves to be substandard or unproductive scholars, poor
teachers, or both. I think some, perhaps many, clinicians and legal writing
faculty have something to say that is worth listening to. And some tenure-track
or tenured faculty may not. Isn't the better system the one that divides people
based on what they have to say, not one that assumes that one group does have
something to say and the other group, categorically, does not?
Of course, all categorical thinking, based as it is on heuristic thinking, is
susceptible to this criticism. That doesn't necessarily make it a bad thing. The
mental shortcut that categories provide is necessary to keep the world from
being overwhelmingly complicated. But here, the categorical thinking fosters
harmful stereotypes by treating a class of people differently for arbitrary
reasons.
The categorical thinking underlying Standard 405(c) makes no institutional
sense. Because Standard 405(c) suppresses advancement for certain groups,
the academy is depriving itself of potential excellence.6 Empirically, there is
4. The logic of this distinction has always eluded me. Apparently, I'm not alone in my
confusion. Hence the scare quotes. See generally Linda H. Edwards, Legal Writing: A Doctrinal
Course, i SAVANNAH L. REV. i (2oi4); Linda H. Edwards, The 2iouble with Categories: What Theory
Can Teach Us about the Doctrine-Skills Divide, 64 J. LEGAL Enuc. ii (2014).
5. Despite the lack of support and encouragement fostered by the double standard of Standard
405 (c), many clinicians and legal writing faculty have refused to be silenced and are busy
developing and expanding their scholarly voices. This scholarship runs the gamut from
theoretical to practical, and covers diverse subjects including pedagogy and beyond. See,
e.g., Terrill Pollman & Linda H. Edwards, Scholarship by Legal Writing Professors: .New Voices in
the LegalAcademy, ii LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 3 (2005); Linda L. Berger et
al., 7he Past, Presence, and Future ofLegal Writing Scholarship: Rhetoric, Voice, and Community, i6 LEGAL
WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 521 (200); ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW
SCHOOL: LEARNING TO "THINK LIKE A LAWYER" 27 (2007) ("some of the most innovative
ideas about improving law teaching can be found in the scholarship of clinical and legal
writing law professors."). In part, this is due to supportive entities like the Association of
Legal Writing Directors, which provide scholarship support to those faculty denied it by
their own institutions, and the Clinical Law Revieo, which provides a peer-edited outlet for
clinical scholarship.
6. See Cameron Anderson & Courtney E. Brown, The Functions and Dysfunctions of Hierarchy, 30
REs. ORG. BEHAV. 55, 76 (uoIO) (when lower-ranked people in a status hierarchy feel they are
treated unfairly, they lose motivation to contribute and become less productive).
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no question that arbitrary hierarchies (those unrelated to performance) inhibit
productivity.7 The opportunity to fairly compete might not only inspire
clinicians and legal writing faculty to excel, but might spur other faculty to be
better as well.'
The argument that clinical and legal writing faculty are hired based on
"different" criteria only supports my point that Standard 405(c) enshrines
and supports an arbitrary and categorical distinction. First, it presumes that
different hiring criteria are appropriate, which I'm not sure is true. I think
law schools, especially in these difficult times, should be seriously rethinking
their standard hiring criteria to get a little more diversity of all kinds in our
institutions (experiential diversity; educational diversity; and racial, class, and
gender diversity). But more important, the "different criteria" argument is
really a "lesser merit criteria" argument. It is another (perhaps politer) way of
saying certain subjects are not as worthy and the people who teach them are
not as excellent. This is logically fallacious. Beyond that, it is simply wrong to
treat other human beings in such a disparaging and dismissive way.
Clinicians and legal writing faculty have much of value to impart to our
institutions-in their scholarship, in teaching, in their connections to the
practicing bar. And I believe that, especially in these times, when law schools
are increasingly called upon to connect with the practicing bar, we need to
expand our view of what good scholarship is. But Standard 405(c) allows us
to remain stagnant, doing things just as we have always done.
But while the institutional cost of Standard 405(c) is worth noting, it
isn't what makes Standard 405(c) such an embarrassment. Making broad
categorical judgments about human beings-and their value-should be
something we do only in rare instances because of the risk of bias and damage.
We should interrogate ourselves carefully when we are tempted to do this to
make sure that it is a moral choice free from discriminatory effect. While it
may be easier to generalize about people, lazy thinking is simply never a good
enough reason to discriminate.
Similarly, institutional autonomy, a rationale frequently raised against
ABA rules about treatment of faculty status, is not a persuasive argument in
favor of Standard 405(c).9 We should be honest with ourselves about what
this autonomy really entails: the freedom to institutionalize a discriminatory
hierarchy. Opponents of the 1964 Civil Rights Act made similar arguments
about that bill's potentially devastating effect on the freedom of private
7. See, e.g., Pfeffer & Langton, supra note 3, at 396 (wage dispersion negatively affects faculty
productivity).
8. See, e.g., id. at 387 (tying job wages to productivity serves as an incentive for all employees to
work harder).
9. See Peter A. Joy & Robert R. Kuehn, 7he Evolution ofABA Standardsfor Clinical Faculty, 75 TENN.
L. REV. 183, 197 (2oo8).
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businesses. ° The argument here is similar, and the answer should be the same.
There is, or should be, no freedom to discriminate.
The Human Costs
The human cost of Standard 405(c) is real and harmful. When they are
arbitrary or discriminatory, status hierarchies exact a serious toll on those
upon whom they are imposed." Institutionalizing status also tends to be
a self-fulfilling prophecy, making movement from lower to higher ranks
exceptionally difficult.I2 As one study put it:
[O]nce a hierarchy gets established, a number of organizational and psy-
chological processes conspire to create different degrees of opportunity to...
acquire more power and status for individuals and groups at different levels
of the hierarchy .... [These processes affect all members of the hierarchy in
ways that perpetuate the established order.'3
For example, when a faculty member is hired on the tenure track, he is hired
with the strong presumption that he will succeed. It is almost unheard of that
he would be "demoted" to Standard 405(c) status. The difference this makes
on a human level cannot be overstated; it simply feels different (and better) to
be hired with the enthusiasm and energy of that presumption of achievement.
The confirmation bias attending this is also real.' 4 The presumption of success
means work-both scholarship and teaching-is viewed through that lens, by
other faculty, by students, and by others. It gives a faculty member the real
support of colleagues and the confidence to succeed. That usually translates
into more productivity and investment in the institution. I'm not saying
that tenure-track faculty do not deserve this presumption, but rather that all
faculty deserve it. And that our institutions and students deserve the kind of
camaraderie and work that is encouraged by this presumption.
The opposite occurs for those hired on the "lesser" track of Standard 405(c).
The performance of those in the lower ranks will be viewed through the lens
of their inferior status. What scholarship is produced will likely be viewed
skeptically and critically-confirmation bias is at work here as well. Students
lO. See generally ToDD S. PuRDuM, AN IDEA WHosETIME HAS COME: Two PARTIES, Two PRESIDENTS
AND THE BATTLE FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2054); DONALD T. CRITCHLOW & NANCY
MACLEAN, DEBATING THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT: 1945 TO THE PRESENT 26-27
(2oo9) (outlining Barry Goldwater's objections to the Civil Rights bill).
ii. Across the board, empirical studies have shown that hierarchical structures led to lower
satisfaction and morale and higher stress and anxiety. Anderson & Brown, supra note 6, at 64.
The evidence of this is "robust." Id.; see also Pfeffer & Langton, supra note 3, at 398, 402 (study
of faculty wage disparity predicted lower productivity and lesser satisfaction).
12. Joe C. Magee & Adam D. Galinsky, Social Hierarchy: ThAe Self-Rcinforcing Nature ofPower and Status,
2 ACAD. MGMT. ANNALS 351, 365 (2008).
13. Id.
14. Indeed, research shows that people tend to overestimate the skills and abilities of those at the
top of the hierarchical structure. Anderson & Brown, supra note 6, at 67.
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also absorb the message. Since students run the law reviews, clinicians and
legal writing faculty likely won't get a fair hearing from the highest-ranked
law reviews. As a result, the skeptical views created by the hierarchy will be
reinforced. In the classroom, students will tend not to give the benefit of
the doubt and may even be disrespectful or challenging, leading to poor
evaluations and yet more "objective" evidence that inferior status is deserved.
Again, this is so damaging on a human level, but also so damaging to the
institution and its students.
Standard 405(c) also has serious emotional costs. It institutionally
entrenches a group of people as "less than" their colleagues. This constant
reminder that the workplace has decided that certain faculty aren't as good,
and never will be, damages self-conception. Faculty members on this track
may begin to believe that they are less valuable. They may begin to believe
they have nothing worth writing in scholarship, so they don't try. 5 They may
not speak up at faculty meetings or committee meetings because they question
the worth of their input.'6 This is a real problem with entrenched hierarchies.7
And it robs the institution of so much valuable input while also robbing the
employees of their dignity and self-respect.
The discriminatory aspect of this hierarchy is even more troubling when
we consider its intersection with race and gender, topics covered ably in other
essays by my colleagues Mel Weresh, Kristen Tiscione, Ann McGinley, and
Teri McMurtry-Chubb. Indeed, given what we know about the gender and
race composition of law faculties, upon close inspection it gets harder and
harder to justify that "different hiring criteria" argument. Professors Weresh,
McGinley and McMurtry-Chubb make clear that Standard 405(c) takes
advantage of and perpetuates the structural sexism and racism of our society.
This should make us very, very uncomfortable.
Standard 405(c) is also damaging to those at the top of the hierarchy.'8 Power
"fundamentally transforms how an individual construes and approaches the
15. Id. at 66 (aggregating studies showing hierarchy suppressed input by low-ranking group
members and overvalued input by higher-ranking group members); id. at 76 (lower rank
reduces self-perception and makes people feel they have less to contribute) (aggregating
studies).
i6. Studies have "consistently shown" that lower-ranked employees stay silent instead of raising
important issues. Psychologists describe what they call "paranoid social cognition" among
those in the lower ranks of an organizational hierarchy. This is evidenced by anxiety, mistrust,
and suspiciousness, especially of those in the higher ranks. The result is a reluctance to
communicate. Id. at 78.
17. Magee & Galinsky, supra note i2, at 370-71. In a study of interactions between tenured and
untenured faculty, tenured professors were less accurate in assessing and interpreting the
comments of their untenured colleagues (citing Dacher Keltner & Robert J. Robinson,
Defending the Status Quo: Power and Bias in Social Conflict, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL.
IO66, 1075-76 (997))-
18. Anderson & Brown, supra note 6, at 74 ("giving individuals power can make them less
accurate in perceiving others and more likely to rely on stereotypes" and biased thinking
when judging others) (citing studies).
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world." Specifically, those in the higher ranks are more likely to view those in
the lower ranks less as individuals and more in terms of group characteristics or
stereotypes.' 9 This is not to say that tenured faculty are bad people or bigoted,
but that we are all human. ° And hierarchy, especially if based on categorical
structures, is "sneaky." It affects our worldview in many ways without our even
realizing it.,' It changes our mind-sets in ways that I think all of us can agree
is not anything to aspire to.
Standard 405(c) also makes intrastatus friendships and collaboration
difficult.- It creates a system in which tenured faculty, however well-intentioned
or kind, may treat contract faculty differently. I confess that I have been guilty
of this on occasion myself since I've received tenure. It is just so hard not to
when you are at meetings others cannot attend or privy to decision-making
that others are not part of.
The bottom line is that Standard 405(c) fosters exclusionary thinking.
People may say hurtful things and not even notice that the statements are
inappropriate.3 For example, I have seen well-meaning tenured faculty simply
forget that clinicians or legal writing faculty are faculty and thus not include
them when speaking about what faculty do or teach. Or leave them out of
email discussions. I don't think this is malicious. It is just the natural human
result of the divisiveness created by a status hierarchy like Standard 405(c).
Conclusion
For all these reasons, I think Standard 405(c) as it is currently implemented
is a very flawed rule, damaging to law schools, students, and all faculty,
tenured and nontenured. We simply shouldn't have a faculty hierarchy based
on generalizations and stereotypes. We especially shouldn't have such a thing
if there is any chance that such a hierarchy reinforces or takes advantage of
structural racism or patriarchy.
I recognize that status evolution is a gradual process starting with small
steps. And I laud Professor Weresh for a thoughtful and commendable step
19. Magee & Galinsky, supra note 12, at 370-71.
2o. Indeed, many tenured law professors are not only wonderful people, but committed to
social justice and eradicating discrimination. In some ways, this can exacerbate the problems
created by Standard 40 5(c)-if we are committed to social justice and are confronted with
a discriminatory status hierarchy, we might be more likely to look for justifications to
legitimatize that hierarchy so we can live with ourselves. See, e.g., Eddie Harmon-Jones, A
Cognitive Dissonance Theory Perspective on Persuasion, in THE PERSUASION HANDBOOK: DEVELOPMENTS
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 99, IO2-O3 (James Price Dillard & Michael Pfau eds., 2002);
KATHLEEN KELLEY REARDON, PERSUASION: THEORY AND CONTEXT 68-69 (1981).
21. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination
and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 1188 (1995).
22. See Anderson & Brown, supra note 6, at 57, 77-78; Pfeffer & Langton, supra note 3, at 382, 388
(wage dispersion negatively affects cooperation and collaboration).
23. Anderson & Brown, supra note 6, at 74 (people in higher-ranking positions less likely to be
polite and more likely to violate social norms).
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forward. But even with a "best practices" document, I cannot defend ABA
Standard 405(c) the way it is implemented now. I think we can, and should,
do better.
